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I. DOMESTIC MOTIVES FOR PROVOCATIVE 
ACTIONS–A COMPARISON
Since 2009, tensions between China and Japan 
have risen dramatically mainly due to the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands dispute. With its growing economic 
and military capabilities, China is becoming more 
and more assertive in its maritime territorial claims, 
and the world has witnessed multiple standoffs 
between the two countries’ forces near the unin-
habited islands. Furthermore, China appears to be 
increasingly confident that it possesses the necessary 
capabilities to challenge the dominant position of 
the United States in Asia, as demonstrated by sev-
eral dangerous encounter incidents. Indeed, a recent 
assessment of the Carnegie Endowment claims that 
the “greater and more active Chinese military and 
paramilitary presence near Japan” has contributed 
to “a level of overall contention and a risk of mili-
tary conflict that was arguably inconceivable even a 
decade ago,” posing a serious challenge to the U.S.-
Japan alliance.1 
Perhaps China’s behaviors seem extremely 
provocative and risky, yet one should not forget that 
Communist China has engaged in several military 
activities against its neighbors and has created ten-
sions in the region. Notable examples include the 
Korean War, the shelling of Jinmen Islands controlled 
by the Nationalists in 1958, and the massive domestic 
mobilization and indirect involvement in the Viet-
nam War. However, as renowned historian Chen 
Jian has argued, these hostile actions during Mao’s 
era were “always for the purpose of domestic mobi-
lization [italicized in the original].” Mao constantly 
needed to create international tension to “legitimate 
the revolution at home and to maintain its momen-
tum.”2 Therefore, many Chinese hostile actions dur-
ing the Cold War were not directly aimed at foreign 
targets. Rather, they contained diversionary effects to 
strengthen Mao and his colleagues’ political authority 
at home by rallying the nation under their command 
to defeat foreign enemies. 
It is the author’s opinion that the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Island dispute today contains diversion-
ary elements as well. The Chinese government, by 
raising and maintaining a certain degree of tension 
with Japan and the United States, is shifting the 
public’s attention away from domestic problems to 
the territorial disputes, thereby gathering support. 
Yet before one concludes that Chinese actions today 
are nearly identical to its Cold War behaviors under 
Mao, it is useful to consider another classic example 
of diversionary war—the Falklands War of 1982. It is 
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widely believed by academics that the authoritarian 
Argentine junta led by President Leopoldo Galtieri 
invaded the Falklands to counter its serious domestic 
legitimacy crisis. In fact, one scholar has observed 
that, “most accounts of Argentina’s invasion of the 
Falklands attribute the junta’s decision” to “a desire to 
restore public support for the government.”3
Coming into power after a military coup in 
1976, the junta faced precarious economic and 
political conditions. Its orthodox monetarist poli-
cies resulted in a massive bank collapse in March 
1980, and the “dirty war” against social oppositions 
had severely alienated the junta from society.4 The 
“dirty war” was so “dirty” that the junta was afraid 
of “Nuremburg-style investigations and trials” after 
democratization took place.5 As a result, the regime 
heated up the Falklands dispute to divert the public’s 
grievances because the islands held patriotic appeal 
to all segments of Argentinian society. But according 
to some scholars, the territorial dispute was aimed at 
not just the Argentinian public but the internal divi-
sions of the regime as well. Having defeated the leftist 
insurgents and oppressed oppositions, the military 
lacked a sense of mission and fractions within the 
regime appeared due to disagreements on economic 
and social policies and competition of bureaucratic 
interests.6 Galtieri therefore initiated the invasion of 
the Falklands to serve the dual purposes of increasing 
domestic popularity and uniting the regime behind 
him. 
China’s domestic situation today is reminis-
cent of Argentina’s in many ways. Despite the robust 
economy, China has its own social instabilities and 
potential for political crisis. Although the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), which constitutes the high-
est political authority in China, possesses far more 
social and military might than the Galtieri junta, 
it is experiencing a legitimacy crisis. With China’s 
opening and reform in the 1980s, communist belief 
has drastically faded away and with it, an ideology 
capable of uniting the entire nation. The arrival of 
investment from abroad has also brought Western 
liberal political ideas that have challenged the CCP’s 
orthodox position as the only legitimate leader of 
China. The call for political liberalization in China 
reached its peak at the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Only 
by resorting to military measures did the CCP avoid 
the fate of their counterparts in Eastern Europe and 
the former USSR. It is probably unlikely today that, 
in the age of instantaneous Chinese social media 
and the high degree of internationalization, another 
Tiananmen Square could take place. However, griev-
ances against government corruption, environmental 
pollution, enormous income inequality, and social 
injustice all have the potential to evolve into what 
the government refers to as a “mass event”—de facto 
demonstrations or civil disobedience. The CCP 
clearly recognized that its ruling status cannot be 
taken for granted when it said in a 2009 report “the 
advanced nature and ruling status of CCP cannot last 
forever by themselves…what we own today does not 
mean we will own them forever.”7
To fill the ideological vacancy, the state 
“launched an extensive patriotic education campaign 
in the 1990s to ensure loyalty in a population that 
was otherwise subjected to many domestic discon-
tents.”8 Nationalism took the place of communism. 
One of the core components of Chinese nationalism 
is the humiliation suffered by China, which includes 
the loss of territory, at the hands of the West and 
Japan in contemporary history. The Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands issue fits in perfectly as an ideal target to di-
vert domestic grievances, especially because of Japan’s 
notorious reputation in China as an extant military 
threat. Just like the Falklands, the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute—and hatred toward Japan—appeals 
to all sections of Chinese society. The dispute satisfies 
the three factors that scholar Amy Oakes considers 
as major influences on diversionary conflicts—mo-
tivation (the existence of social unrest), domestic 
constraints (the regime is unable to perform political 
liberalization or extreme oppression), and opportu-
nity (the regime is able to find a popular target).9 
Of course, many differences exist between the 
Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. 
Whereas the Argentinian junta started the war, 
Beijing is determined, as least for now, to avoid a 
war with Japan and possibly with the United States. 
A military defeat would not only derail China’s 
economic growth, which to a considerable degree 
relies on healthy economic relationship with Asian 
economies such as Japan’s, but could also instigate a 
political crisis. In this sense, China’s practice today 
is similar to many practices during Mao’s era, when 
foreign-targeted actions were often limited but nev-
ertheless aroused immense domestic revolutionary 
fervor. Another distinction is that, while Galtieri and 
his colleagues enjoyed the surge of nationalism, there 
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are signs that the Chinese government has growing 
concerns about it getting out of control. A strongly 
nationalistic public may lead the state to lose control 
of the direction of nationalism. China expert Susan 
Shirk claims that nationalism “has boxed the CCP 
and its leaders into a corner,” and a recent study by 
the International Crisis Group concludes that Chi-
nese nationalism is restricting the room for diplo-
matic mitigation.10
By discussing the shelling of Jinmen in Mao’s 
era, the Falklands War, and the current Diaoyu/
Senkaku dispute, this paper intends to find histori-
cal resemblance between the former two and the 
latter. Some questions to be addressed in this paper 
are: Does the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute inherit 
characteristics from both Mao’s era and the Falklands 
War? If so, what is unique about the current dispute 
and, most importantly, will China start a diversion-
ary war with Japan over the islands? Shirk claims that 
when the CCP’s “political survival” is at risk, China 
will go to war regardless of consequences in order to 
prevent domestic humiliation (loss of legitimacy).11 
It will be devastating to the world if two crucial 
economic powerhouses go to war over uninhab-
ited rocks, so what measures should China and the 
international community, respectively, take then to 
minimize the possibility that China goes to war for 
legitimacy reasons?
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
To analyze Mao’s actions during the Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, Thomas Christensen first estab-
lishes the conceptual structure of “two-level foreign 
policy analysis” in his book, Useful Adversaries: 
Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
American Conflict, 1947-1958. This structure focuses 
on how domestic political concerns can drive a na-
tion’s foreign policy. In explaining why the relations 
between the United States and the newly established 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) remained hostile 
before Nixon’s rapprochement in the early 1970s, 
Christensen argues that something more than the 
realists’ balance of power theory was at work: the 
Cold War was “similar before and after 1972,” so why 
did the bipolarity and the common Soviet threat “not 
push leaders in similar directions in the 1950s?”12 To 
solve this conundrum, Christensen comes up with 
his two-level approach by analyzing the domestic po-
litical conditions in both the United States and PRC. 
He concludes that by using vitriolic anti-communist 
rhetoric and shelling the Jinmen Islands, President 
Truman and Mao Zedong created tensions short of 
war to gain domestic support to implement the Mar-
shall Plan and the Great Leap Forward (GLF), respec-
tively.13 In his chapter on the 1958 Taiwan Strait Cri-
sis, Christensen refutes claims that Mao, by shelling 
the islands, attempted expanding the PRC’s territory, 
testing American resolve on Taiwan, drawing Soviet 
support, or defending itself from American threats. 
Instead, Mao used the international crisis to launch 
his GLF, which required extraordinary sacrifices from 
Chinese peasants to achieve utopian industrial and 
agricultural goals.14
Chen Jian reaffirms Christensen’s argument in 
his Mao’s China & The Cold War. By offering a closer 
scrutiny of the PRC’s domestic political movements 
and foreign policies during the Cold War, Chen Jian 
observes that Mao used tensions ranging from the 
Korean War and the Jinmen shelling to the Vietnam 
War to create momentum to sustain his domestic 
revolutionary programs, such as the anti-Rightist 
Campaign in 1957 and the GLF a year later.15 Chen 
attributes Mao’s anxiety about China losing its revo-
lutionary fervor—the “postrevolution anxiety”—as 
the main reason why he ordered the shelling of Jin-
men. According to Chen, Mao could use the tension 
created by the shelling to exploit the Chinese people’s 
“victim mentality” generated by past Western colo-
nialism to mobilize for the GLF.16 
There is a rich scholarly literature on diversion-
ary war theory. Jack S. Levy, a political scientist, 
reviews the existing literature on diversionary war 
theory and summarizes the claims of both support-
ers and opponents of this theory in The Diversionary 
Theory of War: A Critique. Levy observes that, while 
historians and sociologists found strong correla-
tions between war and domestic support for national 
governments, as demonstrated by the Crimean War, 
political science studies failed to reveal such a strong 
relationship.17 Levy, disturbed by the discrepancy 
between the two academic fields, conducts an ex-
amination on existing literature and identifies the 
shortcomings of political science research on this 
theory. He criticizes the political science literature 
for lacking a “well-developed theoretical framework 
guiding what are basically descriptive correlational 
analyses” and for paying inadequate attention to “the 
direction of the relationship between internal and 
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external conflict and to the causal mechanism driv-
ing the relationship.”18 While remaining supportive 
of diversionary war theory, Levy also acknowledges 
the reciprocal effect of internal and external conflict, 
noting how diversionary conflicts can ruin internal 
stability that elites were trying to preserve.19
One piece of literature that opposes diversion-
ary war theory deserves special attention. M. Taylor 
Fravel, when explaining the PRC’s past territorial 
concessions to its neighbors, proposes the “diversion-
ary peace” theory, which states that authoritarian 
leaders “are more likely to compromise (in a territo-
rial dispute) when confronting internal threats to re-
gime security, including rebellions and legitimacy cri-
sis.”20 From studies of Chinese territorial concessions 
in places like Tibet and Xinjiang, Fravel concludes 
that leaders might give up certain territorial claims 
in exchange for outside recognition of its domestic 
policies and focus its power more on domestic issues, 
particularly when facing unrest near its borders.21 
However, Fravel himself acknowledges that “diver-
sionary peace” theory does not apply to the Diaoyu/
Senkaku case because, unlike the often-unpublicized 
border dispute, it has nationalistic importance to the 
Chinese public and due to the islands’ strategic and 
economic value.22 Moreover, his theory better ap-
plies to China’s ethnic-diverse regions, where Beijing 
needs more resources to prevent ethnic separation 
movements than to maritime disputes. Still, his work 
demonstrates that Chinese intransigence on Diaoyu/
Senkaku does not stem from established practices. 
Amy Oakes’ case study on the 1982 Falklands 
War further strengthens diversionary war theory. 
Oakes cautions against the linear relationship be-
tween domestic unrest and diversionary military 
actions, considering the unsupportive results from 
political science studies.23 She supplements the exist-
ing diversionary war thesis by introducing the “alter-
native approach” and the “state extractive capacity” 
concept.24 According to Oakes, a state will engage in 
diversionary actions when it cannot either reform the 
political system or repress the oppositions (running 
out of alternative approaches) because of low extrac-
tive capacity—the price of either reform or repression 
is too unbearable. According to Oates, The Falklands 
War was a “classic instance” of diversionary war 
because the junta could not meet the public’s demand 
to reform—to end military rule—and the severe eco-
nomic crisis, together with the unprecedented scale 
of public opposition, crippled the junta’s capability to 
conduct repression.25 I will argue later in this paper 
that it is increasingly difficult for China to adopt 
alternative approaches as well. 
Fravel, however, has replied to Oak’s argument 
through his own examination of the Falklands War. 
He claims the reason the Galtieri junta invaded the 
island was “to compel British concessions at the ne-
gotiating table, not to defeat attention from the junta’s 
domestic woes.”26 If domestic crisis was really what 
triggered the invasion, Fravel questions, then why did 
the junta before Galtieri, who also faced social unrest, 
fail to initiate the diversionary conflict? Instead of di-
versionary motivations, he attributes the cause of war 
to realist explanations: the Argentinian’s frustration 
with the lengthy but futile diplomacy, the perception 
of declining British resolve, and a short window of 
opportunity before Britain may harden its attitude.27 
Fravel’s argument has its merit, and indeed the 
lengthy but unproductive negotiations and a preemp-
tive strike opportunity played a hand in the junta’s 
decision. Nevertheless, he neglects some empirical 
evidence that supports the applicability of diversion-
ary war theory to this case. First of all, as late as the 
second half of 1980, the Argentinian government was 
still primarily focused on its Beagle Channel dis-
pute with Chile, and therefore, it could not afford to 
antagonize two powerful players at once.28 Secondly, 
its relationship with Britain remained vital for several 
important defense contracts. Thirdly, although the 
negotiation process was long, it was not futile: by late 
1980, a possible lease-back agreement was within 
sight.29 Last but not least, a conflict with Britain, 
however uncommitted to the Falklands it might be, 
would be a risky move and therefore a last-ditch mea-
sure for the junta. I will explore these points in detail 
in the empirical analyses section on the war. 
In another paper co-written with Lily I. Vakili, 
Levy, while affirming that the junta went to war in 
1982 for diversionary reasons, attributes the cause 
of war to the internal division of the junta. Levy and 
Vakili argue that, after the anti-Montoneros (an op-
position guerilla group) campaign, the junta lacked a 
“unifying mission,” and internal divisions along bu-
reaucratic interests began to intensify, leading Galt-
ieri to launch the war to unite the regime.30 However, 
Oakes repudiates this argument, claiming that the 
legitimacy crisis was so severe that even a cohesive 
regime would need to divert attention.31 
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Historians have paid much attention to the 
Falklands War. Sir Lawrence Freedman’s The Of-
ficial History Of The Falklands Campaign, and Max 
Hastings and Simon Jenkins’ Battle for the Falklands 
provide a detailed overview of the war. Their works 
reveal some noteworthy characteristics of the Falk-
lands crisis that apply to Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. 
For example, nationalism, instead of the Falklands’ 
strategic or economic value, was at the core of the 
dispute.32 Similarly, nationalism limited room for 
diplomatic negotiations.33 Moreover, ultranational-
ists’ popular yet provocative actions and miscalcula-
tions by low-level military personnel can easily men-
ace the fragile peace without sanction from higher 
authority.34 Lastly, Argentina’s economic importance 
for Britain did not prevent it from going to war.35 
The historical literature also provides empirical 
support for the political scientists who uphold the 
relevance of diversionary war theory. Both Freedman 
and Hastings mention the junta’s imperative for di-
versionary actions, and an examination of Argentina’s 
military decisions by historian Martin Middlebrook 
confirms Oakes’ claim that the desire to conduct di-
versionary actions does not necessarily equal war.36
So far, there is no literature that directly com-
pares the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with the Falk-
lands. However, many works have studied Chinese 
nationalism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. One 
prominent work is China, Fragile Superpower by Su-
san L. Shirk. By examining Chinese social instability, 
Shirk observes that the Chinese state is increasingly 
exploiting nationalism, which is already embedded in 
many aspects of Chinese society, to divert the public’s 
attention and boost support for the government. Yet 
Shirk warns that nationalist fervor could eventually 
backfire in starting an unwanted international con-
flict and, as the subtitle of her book suggests, “Derail 
Its (China’s) Peaceful Rise” because “not lashing out 
(against Japan, Taiwan, or the U.S.) might endanger 
Party rule” by making the government appear weak 
in front of the nationalistic public.37 Shirk is particu-
larly afraid this scenario might take place over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes.38
 Shirk’s argument is echoed by Zhao Suisheng, 
whose work, A Nation-State by Construction, records 
and analyzes Chinese nationalism from its origin 
in the Qing Dynasty to today. Zhao identifies three 
brands of Chinese nationalism: nativism, anti-tradi-
tionalism, and pragmatic nationalism.39 He consid-
ers anti-Japanese sentiment to be controlled by the 
state-led pragmatic nationalism, yet shows that when 
the state fails to act forcefully on the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute, the more hawkish nativism is used to criti-
cize the state.40 He makes similar observations about 
the diversionary effect of nationalism and the erosion 
of state’s monopoly on nationalism in his published 
essay as well.41 
The study “Dangerous Waters: China-Japan 
Relations on the Rocks” by the International Crisis 
Group offers a history of Sino-Japanese disputes over 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and summarizes each 
sides’ perspectives. It also mentions how Chinese na-
tionalism is forcing the government to be assertive.42 
James Manicom focuses on Sino-Japanese confron-
tation and cooperation in the disputed Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) in East China Sea. His work 
reminds us that one should not view the Diaoyu/Sen-
kaku dispute in isolation because it lies in the back-
ground of the EEZ dispute, and that Sino-Japanese 
maritime cooperation is not completely impossible 
even when encountering hostile domestic popular 
opinion.43 
III. THE SECOND TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS
At 5:30pm on August 23, 1958, the People’s Lib-
eration Army (PLA) in the coastal region of Fujian 
Province, under Mao’s order, fired tens of thousands 
of artillery shells toward the Kuomintang (KMT)-
controlled Jinmen Islands, only two miles off the 
coastal city of Xiamen (Amoy). The massive shelling 
caught the KMT garrison on the islands completely 
off guard, destroying the entire communication net-
work.44 In 85 minutes, the PLA fired a total of more 
than thirty thousands shells, killing more than 600 
KMT soldiers on the islands.45 The intense shell-
ing continued until early October, accompanied by 
a naval blockade of the islands and sporadic aerial 
combats between the PLA air force and KMT air 
force in Chinese airspace. 
The shelling, later known as the second Tai-
wan Strait Crisis, immediately raised tensions in the 
Asia-Pacific and could have triggered a nuclear war. 
President Eisenhower was afraid that the massive 
artillery operation was a prelude to an invasion of not 
only Jinmen and other offshore islands, but also the 
Pescadores (islets in the middle of the Taiwan Strait) 
and even Taiwan.46 As a result, he reinforced the 
Seventh Fleet by transferring vessels from the Sixth 
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Fleet, which was dealing with the crisis in Lebanon 
and Iraq.47 According to general Ye Fei, at the time 
commissar of the Fuzhou military district and hand-
picked by Mao as the commander of the shelling op-
eration, the U.S. naval presence in the Taiwan Strait 
included “seven aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, 
and forty destroyers.”48 The Joint Chiefs of Staff even 
discussed the possibilities of using tactical nuclear 
weapons against Chinese airfields in the coastal 
areas.49 Given that the Soviet Union had signed a 
defense treaty with China, the shelling indeed could 
easily have expanded the conflict way beyond the tiny 
offshore islands. 
The military confrontation gradually subsided 
in October after Mao issued several statements an-
nouncing a four-week ceasefire. Although the shell-
ing continued afterward, it took on a more symbolic 
meaning: the PLA only opened fire on odd days but 
not on even days, and the shells were intentionally 
fired on clear beaches. The KMT garrison followed 
likewise. In Mao’s words, the pattern was meant to let 
Chiang’s soldiers “get out to do some exercises and 
get some sunshine,” so that they can “stay there for 
long.”50 
Why did Mao suddenly decide to bombard 
the islands, raising the tensions in the West Pacific, 
only to conduct a unilateral ceasefire later and allow 
KMT forces to stay? An obvious geopolitical expla-
nation would be that Mao wanted to destroy KMT’s 
offshore bases that were frequently used to conduct 
harassments and sabotages against the Mainland and 
could serve as bases for Chiang Kai Sheik’s “counter 
attack on Mainland.” KMT forces often conducted 
small-scale “surveillance and harassment” operations 
against the PRC’s maritime transportation around 
Fujian Province, and the KMT air force used the 
Mainland’s airspace for “surveillance, training, and 
airdropping anti-communist pamphlets.”51 By shell-
ing the Jinmen Islands (including transferring fighter 
jets into Fujian Province to secure the airspace), Mao 
indeed could hope to destroy the KMT forces’ ability 
to further harass the Mainland. 
Nevertheless, Mao’s motive was definitely not 
limited to geopolitical considerations. If he intended 
to permanently get rid of KMT bases near the Main-
land’s coast, why not just take the islands after the 
intense shelling? After all, according to general Ye 
Fei, one month into the shelling, the supply lines to 
the islands were cut off, defense fortifications were 
destroyed, and the KMT garrison endured severe 
shortages of food and ammunition.52 The PLA could 
“easily take the islands if we launch a landing opera-
tion.”53 Instead of exploiting the perfect military 
opportunity, Mao, under the name of PRC Defense 
Minister Peng Dehuai, issued a public statement on 
People’s Daily on October 6, announcing that: “tem-
porarily from seven days on from October the 6th, 
we will stop the shelling, you can freely transport 
supplies with no American escort.”54 A week later, 
Mao issued another announcement: “The shelling of 
Jinmen will stop for another two weeks after today, 
to observe enemy’s movement, and to let the compa-
triots on Jinmen to get ample supply, including food 
and military equipment, so that they can stay lon-
ger.”55 These orders clearly indicate that Mao wanted 
KMT forces to stay. 
In fact, Mao chose the worst time possible for 
an amphibious invasion to start the shelling. Late 
autumn was the typhoon season for Fujian, and the 
abominable sea condition made the PLA Navy’s at-
tack boats, which had light tonnage, hard to maneu-
ver.56 Given that the PLA Navy didn’t have heavier 
vessels, unfriendly sea conditions basically rendered 
the Navy useless beyond minor scuffles. General Ye 
also mentions that heavy rain badly damaged trans-
portation routs and made disease prevalent among 
soldiers in his memoir.57 This evidence suggests that 
Mao did not plan to take the islands from the begin-
ning.
Mao was also very cautious when considering 
how to deal with the Americans in the operation. 
Two days before the shelling, when listening to Ye 
Fei’s report, Mao asked him if it would be possible 
to avoid hitting the American advisors on Jinmen 
Islands.58 Throughout the campaign, Ye Fei followed 
strict guidelines preventing the PLA air force’s air-
crafts from flying beyond the PRC’s airspace to avoid 
contact with U.S. airplanes. The aircrafts were even 
ordered to take off against the direction of the coast, 
so that they would not fly into the Taiwan Strait.59 In 
late August, when American vessels began to provide 
escort to KMT supply ships, Mao ordered his troops 
to only fire upon KMT vessels but not the Ameri-
can ones. Much to Ye and other officers’ perplexity, 
even if American ships fired back, they were not 
allowed to attack them unless given direct orders 
from Mao.60 Why would Mao, who started this seri-
ous provocation, eagerly try to avoid confrontations 
130
columbia university journal of politics & society
with the Americans? The only answer would be that 
he wanted to maintain the conflict on a very limited 
scale. In other words, his purpose was not to defeat 
any foreign adversaries. 
Historians have attributed other reasons to 
Mao’s actions. One of them is that Mao was trying 
to support the anti-colonial struggle in the Middle 
East by diverting U.S. forces into the West Pacific.61 
Eisenhower did transfer ships from the Sixth Fleet 
to the Seventh Fleet, but by late July, the tension 
had started to calm down.62 Another explanation is 
that Mao wanted to know how committed the U.S. 
was to Chiang, and he tested their relationship by 
shelling the offshore islands.63 To some extent, this 
statement is accurate. Mao paid close attention to 
the interactions between Chiang and his American 
allies. He was especially pleased to see that Chiang 
and the Americans disagreed on whether they should 
abandon the islands. For the Americans, the islands 
had little strategic value, and Eisenhower was clear 
that the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan did not 
cover the islands, urging Chiang to retreat. To Chi-
ang, however, the islands provided him the legiti-
macy that his government still represented China, 
and he openly expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
Americans.64 By expanding the KMT-U.S. animosity, 
Mao wished to “ally with Chiang against the U.S.” to 
prevent Taiwan from gaining independence.65
The major reason why Mao decided to shell the 
islands, however, was to create a warlike, revolution-
ary domestic atmosphere to facilitate the launch of 
the Great Leap Forward. Mao had reason to feel iso-
lated on the world stage in 1958. Under the Mutual 
Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the PRC-U.S. relation-
ship did not show sign of improvement. Also, PRC-
Soviet relations began to deteriorate as well. Mao 
had a very negative attitude toward Khrushchev’s 
“peaceful coexistence” concept with Western nations, 
believing that communist revolutions should never 
lose their momentum.66 He also regarded China as 
the legitimate world leader of revolutions. In mid-
1958, when the Soviets proposed to establish a Sino-
USSR submarine fleet and build a long-wave radio 
station on China’s east coast, Mao refused angrily and 
held sharp talks with the Soviet ambassador.67 When 
Khrushchev visited China from late July to early Au-
gust to try to calm things down, Mao did not inform 
Khrushchev about the incipient shelling.68 These 
cracks between the two socialist countries paved the 
way for the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, and 
reinforced Mao’s fear that the Soviets may one day 
collude with the U.S. against China. Therefore, Mao 
launched the GLF to significantly bolster the PRC’s 
national power to deter any potential foreign aggres-
sion. 
Domestically, Mao had just finished the Anti-
Rightist campaign in 1957 and felt that the time was 
right to start a new wave of revolution that could 
push China’s “socialist revolution and reconstruc-
tion to a higher level.”69 The GLF aimed to transform 
China, then a still impoverished nation, to a world 
superpower. It set the unrealistic industrial goal of 
surpassing Britain and the United States in major in-
dustrial output within 15-20 years, and this was most 
vividly demonstrated by the mass steel production 
campaign, during which each household donated 
nearly every metal product it owned to make steel in 
many backyard furnaces. Food production was also 
given absurd goals, like “ten thousand jin [a Chinese 
weight unit; one jin equals to 0.5 kilogram] of rice 
per acre.” Just to show how unrealistic the agricul-
tural goals were, one famous mural in a commune 
depicted a pig as huge as an elephant, huge enough to 
feed an entire commune. 
Other crucial aspects of the socialist transfor-
mation included rural communization and building 
the militia to increase productivity. Rural communes 
required Chinese peasants to give up what remained 
of their small plot of private land and household 
property to join the “people’s commune” to work 
and eat together. Christensen characterizes this as 
“the ultimate sacrifice for the greatest percentage of 
Chinese citizens.”70 More excruciating for them was 
that the GLF focused on heavy industry, state capital 
accumulation, and atomic weapons, items that would 
not directly benefit the peasants in the short term.71 
Building the militia required further sacrifices by 
introducing military structure and discipline into the 
communes, leading to even less reward for the peas-
ants’ tremendous amount of work. Although raising 
food production was also a goal, collectivization led 
the state to take most of the crops. Given that merely 
five years had passed since the Korean War, it would 
take unimaginable willingness for the peasants to 
sacrifice their personal welfare to build China into a 
superpower. 
Consequently, Mao needed to persuade his 
people that it was worthwhile and necessary to en-
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dure such huge sacrifices. He achieved this by raising 
the tension in West Pacific. Mao clearly understood 
that, by shelling the islands, he would further deterio-
rate Sino-U.S. relations and increase the possibility of 
a direct military conflict. Mao used the state of affairs 
that he had created to convince the people that their 
country was in real danger of war with the imperial-
ists and that they needed to make extra contributions 
to defend it. As Christensen argues, Mao was not 
actually preparing China for war, but was creating a 
“siege mentality necessary to extract massive sacri-
fices from the Chinese public.”72 Chen Jian corrobo-
rates Christensen’s argument in he similar remark: 
“he (Mao) found that the tension emerging in the 
Taiwan Strait provided him with much needed means 
to legitimize the unprecedented mass mobilization in 
China.”73 Chinese historians agree to this conclusion 
as well, with military historian Xu Yan observing: 
“it is consistent with Mao’s thought to use struggles 
against the enemy to stir people’s revolutionary fervor 
to mobilize every positive factors for revolution and 
construction.”74 Finally, Mao himself belied his inten-
tion in a letter to Peng on July 27, 1958. In the letter, 
he claimed “it would be best if the enemy attacks 
Zhang Zhou, Shan Tou, Fu Zhou, and Hang Zhou,” 
all important southeastern cities, so that “politics can 
be in charge.”75 Apparently, manufacturing warlike 
atmosphere was Mao’s primary goal.
The shelling also aligned perfectly with building 
militias. During or close to the period of the shelling, 
Mao issued several directives to strengthen build-
ing militias. In September, Mao told journalists from 
Xinhua Press, the state press agency of China, that 
we must “establish militia units on a massive level.”76 
In another speech in December, Mao said: “If the 
imperialists dare to invade us, then we will achieve 
the goal of every man a soldier …”77 
What happened in China after the shelling is 
further evidence that Mao used the crisis for do-
mestic purposes. China put its focus on socialist 
construction while only conducting symbolic and 
sporadic shelling of Jinmen. The naval blockade was 
lifted as well. Moreover, the decrease in military 
personnel and defense budget to the lowest in 1958-
1959 since 1949 demonstrates that Mao focused on 
domestic construction first.78
 Could one categorize Mao’s shelling of Jin-
men as a diversionary action? Under the traditional 
definition of diversionary war, it would be difficult 
to do so, most notably because Mao did not face any 
threats to his rule at all in 1958. Even though Mao 
was constantly afraid that his country lacked revo-
lutionary momentum, he was not concerned that 
someone might take his post (it was not until 1970 
when he and Lin Biao became rivals) or that the 
Chinese public will no longer view him as the Chi-
nese revolution’s great leader. There were no political 
opponents capable of voicing dissent after the Anti-
Rightists Campaign, and Mao enjoyed absolute au-
thority within the CCP. This was well demonstrated 
at the 1959 Lushan Conference, when Mao publicly 
denounced the revered Peng Dehuai in front of other 
CCP leaders because Peng had written Mao a letter 
urging him to seriously consider the negative con-
sequences of the GLF. Banded as a “careerist,” Peng 
lost his post as Defense Minister and other leaders 
concurred with Mao’s decision.79 
In conclusion, Mao decided to shell the Jinmen 
Islands and considerably raised the tension in West 
Pacific largely out of domestic concerns. He needed a 
limited military confrontation to create a warlike do-
mestic atmosphere necessary to extract sacrifice from 
the people to implement the GLF while also taking 
care to not let the conflict escalate into war. The shell-
ing operation was not designed to create dramatic 
international event to rally up popular support for a 
crumbling regime, so in this sense, it was not a diver-
sionary action. Yet it did have a diversionary effect by 
making the people less focused on the hardship they 
would endure. Mao’s action was much more provoca-
tive than China’s assertiveness today, yet contrary to 
many realist explanations, the shelling was mainly a 
ploy for domestic political purposes.80 The Second 
Taiwan Strait Crisis reminds people that China has 
precedent of being provocative, and that provocative 
actions do not always imply a bid for geopolitical 
domination.
IV.  THE FALKLANDS WAR
The Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands 
on April 2, 1982, completely took Britain by surprise. 
More than a thousand Argentine Marines easily took 
over what they considered to be their historical terri-
tory, while the Governor of the Falklands, Rex Hunt, 
only had 75 Royal Marines whose major duty was 
to provide symbolic British military presence and to 
deal with minor Argentine intrusions.81 Why, all of 
a sudden, did the Argentine junta, led by Leopoldo 
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Galtieri, launch the invasion? Evidence suggests that 
the junta did so for diversionary purposes—to ame-
liorate its domestic legitimacy crisis by conducting 
a military operation that would be supported by the 
entire Argentine society. 
But could it be that the junta initiated the inva-
sion, as Fravel suggests, for strategic or diplomatic 
purposes? Historical evidence does not demonstrate 
either of them to be the primary reason for the 
conflict. The Falklands were of minor strategic im-
portance to both Britain and Argentina. During the 
Cold War, Britain’s central security focus was in line 
with NATO—to counter a potential Soviet intrusion 
into Europe. The Royal Navy’s concentration was in 
European waters, instead of the Falklands some 8,000 
nautical miles away from Britain.82 The only British 
naval presence in the South Atlantic was Enduran-
ce, an ice patrol ship with very limited armament 
that spent around five months during the Antarctic 
Summer in the waters of the Falklands and its de-
pendency islands. Even Endurance was constantly a 
target for naval budget cuts, and finally, in June 1981, 
Thatcher’s conservative government decided to put 
it out of service in 1982.83 The insignificant status 
of the Falklands was also highlighted by Britain’s 
military contingency plan of 1976 in light of a pos-
sible Argentine invasion. Because of the distance, the 
Navy could not afford the cost of a constant presence, 
and a deterrence force comprised of a frigate or a 
nuclear submarine was not only expensive, but also 
may have been viewed by Argentina as a provocation. 
By contrast, Argentina enjoyed military initiatives. 
It had ample options to harm the islands, such as a 
blockade, termination of supplies, and air service.84 
Therefore, the only viable option if a conflict took 
place was for the Navy to recapture the islands, but it 
would take weeks to assemble a task force and arrive 
at the Falklands. In addition, the amphibious strength 
required (including an aircraft carrier) was consid-
ered too much to be applied to the remote colony.85 
The contingency review in 1981 only reaffirmed the 
difficulties.86 In short, due to the Falkland Island’s 
distance and strategic unimportance, the British con-
tingency plan was no plan at all. 
The Falklands occupied little attention in British 
civil affairs as well. The prospect for long-term de-
velopment was bleak, and the economy of the islands 
heavily depended on wool production that was con-
stantly affected by the fluctuating international wool 
price. Geographically, the islands were “distant and 
inhospitable,” and ironically, they relied on Argentina 
for many essential services and markets.87 To address 
the “growing concern about the decline of the Falk-
land Islands’ economy and the Islands’ loss of popula-
tion (which was about 2000),” the British government 
in 1976 asked Lord Shackleton to conduct an eco-
nomic survey.88 Much to the government’s irritation, 
Shackleton’s report claimed that the islands’ economy 
could be self-sufficient provided there was enough 
investment. However, it also acknowledged that 
crucial pillars of the economy, such as tourism, were 
dependent “to a large extent on the establishment of 
commercial air links” with neighboring countries.89 
In January 1981, the new British Nationality Bill only 
gave Falklands residents whose parents or grandpar-
ents were not born in the United Kingdom citizen-
ship of the British Dependent Territories, despite 
strong objection from the islands.90 Nicholas Ridley, 
Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), when negotiating with Argentine For-
eign Minister Cavándoli in April 1980, claimed that 
the only territorial claim he cared about was that “to 
Bordeaux because of the wine!”91 
The Falkland Islands were of secondary impor-
tance to Argentina at best. Throughout its negotia-
tions with Britain, Argentina was also concerned 
with the Beagle Channel Dispute with Chile. In fact, 
Argentina nearly went to war with Chile over the 
dispute, and only the intervention and eventual ar-
bitration of the Vatican prevented the conflict.92 Ar-
gentina was actually more occupied with the Beagle 
Channel Dispute than with the Falklands as late as 
November 1980. It was not until the Vatican ruled the 
Channel dispute in favor of Chile that the Falkland 
issue “rush to the fore.”93 Even during the Falklands 
War, the junta kept many of its best-trained troops 
along the Chilean border.94 Obviously, the Beagle 
Channel had more strategic importance than the 
Falklands. There were indications that the Falklands 
had potential oil reserves, but Argentina viewed the 
oil potential “small and very long term,” and turned 
down British requests for joint development.95 Thus, 
from a geopolitical perspective, the Falklands were 
insignificant, casting doubt on the applicability of the 
realist model. Moreover, if the Falklands were stra-
tegically important to Argentina, then why did the 
consecutive juntas not occupy them before 1982? 
Fravel argues the invasion was the product of 
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Argentina’s growing dissatisfaction with its futile 
diplomatic efforts with the British. The negotiations 
first started in December 1965, following a UN Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution pressing the two countries 
to peacefully solve the dispute. Yet in the seventeen 
years preceding the war, there was no agreement on 
the sovereignty issue, the core objective of Argentina. 
Fravel thinks the war “reflects the culmination of Ar-
gentine frustration from 1981 that continued to grow 
in 1982.”96 It is beyond dispute that the slow progress 
in negotiations made the junta impatient and there-
fore more likely to start a conflict. An examination of 
diplomatic relations between Britain and Argentina, 
however, suggests that the lack of progress was not 
the trigger of the war. 
First of all, the relationship between Britain and 
Argentina remained cordial throughout the entire 
negotiation process. Argentina was much more 
important economically to Britain than were the 
Falkland Islands: “trade with the Falklands was worth 
a few percent of that with Argentina.”97 Freedman 
records British economic interest in Argentina as 
including at least “£240 million, as well as investment 
worth £60 million.”98 Meanwhile, the British govern-
ment was unwilling to provide the funds necessary 
for extending the airfield at Stanley, the capital of the 
Falklands, at the cost of 3 to 5 million pounds. It even 
ridiculed the idea of the extension, a central recom-
mendation from the Shackleton report, as “an expen-
sive fantasy.”99
Ironically, Argentina was also a prominent cli-
ent for British defense sales. During the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, Britain strengthened Argentina’s 
Navy and Air Force by selling the latter minesweep-
ers, Canberra bombers, two Type 42 destroyers, Lynx 
helicopters, and secret information about Sea Wolf 
anti-air missiles.100 Thatcher’s conservative govern-
ment was even less restrictive on arms sales, pro-
posing to sell either the aircraft carrier Invincible or 
Hermes plus Sea Harriers (backbones of the British 
taskforce during the war) and even a Vulcan nuclear 
bomber.101 If Argentina or Britain became more 
hostile toward each other during the lengthy diplo-
matic process, these arms sales would not have been 
proposed or taken place. 
Secondly, the negotiations were not completely 
futile. In 1971, a communications agreement was 
signed to increase interactions between the Falklands 
and Argentina, so that the stubborn islanders would 
see the benefits of a closer relationship with Argen-
tina. In November 1980, Britain and then Argentine 
dictator Jorge Videla agreed to negotiate on the basis 
of a lease-back, which would allow Britain to “lease” 
the islands before transferring sovereignty to Argen-
tina. Ultimately, the uncompromising position of the 
islanders proved to be the only reason that this new 
initiative failed.102 In February 1982, the talk in New 
York, although failing to reach substantial agreement, 
resulted in a communiqué that stated: “The meet-
ing took place in a cordial and positive spirit.”103 The 
Galtieri junta, however, was not pleased with it and 
replaced it with a unilateral hawkish statement.104 
One can observe that the consecutive Argentina 
governments, although not satisfied with the negotia-
tions, did not regard them as worthless or obnoxious, 
and it was not until Galtieri’s regime that Argentina 
suddenly took a harder stance. The nature of the sud-
den hawkishness of Argentina in 1982 thus cannot 
be explained by the mounting frustration, as Fravel 
argues, but rather by Argentina’s worsening economic 
and political situation in 1982.
It is beyond dispute that the Galtieri junta faced 
extremely difficult economic and political condi-
tions in 1982. The junta’s orthodox liberal economic 
policies only aggravated the already plummeting 
economy. In Fravel’s account, the peso “dropped by 
more than 600 percent against the dollar, national 
debt increased by 30 percent to 35 billion dollars, and 
inflation grew from double to triple digits.”105 Oakes 
observes that the Argentine government was “on the 
verge of insolvency” due to its debt that made up 60 
percent of its GDP. Oakes even states that Galtieri’s 
new Minister of Economy, Roberto Alemán, was 
more devoted to orthodox liberal measures than 
his predecessors, as demonstrated by the freeze of 
government wages.106 Similarly, Hastings and Jenkins 
describe Alemán’s orthodox economic package intro-
duced in January 1982 as one of “devastating sever-
ity” and “bold to the point of recklessness,” turning 
economic conditions from bad to worse.107
Tightly connected with the economic downturn 
was the increasingly challenging legitimacy crisis. 
Fravel is correct that both the economic and politi-
cal crises were present before the Galtieri regime, 
but, as Oakes argues, in 1982, the junta’s legitimacy 
was questioned unlike before. In fact, the junta 
faced a more difficult situation than just two years 
before when its annihilation of political opponents 
was ruthlessly effective.108 The failure of economic 
reforms encouraged the business circle and the media 
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to openly criticize the government for the first time, 
while the Catholic Church, which used to be ac-
commodating to the juntas, distanced itself from the 
regime.109 Dissident political parties also formed a 
united opposition—the Multipartidaria and mothers 
of the victims of the Dirty War were also gathering in 
squares to demand explanation for their disappeared 
children, drawing international attention.110 Thus, 
the Galtieri junta faced more severe crises than its 
predecessors. The economic crisis reduced the gov-
ernment’s affordability to conduct a long-term sup-
pression operation while the political crisis induced 
more opponents to demand democratic reform. 
According to Oakes, the junta enjoyed little extractive 
capacity, making a diversionary action an extremely 
attractive solution. 
The Falkland Islands were considered to be the 
historical territory of Argentina, and retaking them 
was a move that would appeal to every section of 
Argentine society, even to the junta’s opposition. One 
central feature of diversionary actions for leaders fac-
ing legitimacy crisis is to “initiate or escalate a foreign 
crisis to demonstrate their competence to be reelect-
ed.”111 Galtieri did not face an upcoming election in 
1982, yet he envisioned that the junta would one day 
become the pro-military party in civilian rule.112 If 
Galtieri could successfully take the Falklands from 
the British imperialists and settle a historic injus-
tice, then logically, his pro-military party would 
have a greater chance to win in a democratic elec-
tion. Furthermore, by demonstrating competency in 
defending national interests and honor, Galtieri could 
restore public confidence in the military govern-
ment and earn more time for the realization of his 
harsh economic policy. As Hastings and Jenkins have 
noticed, the recovery of the Falklands would “at least 
unite the nation for a time…serve as a vindication of 
military rule and cleanse the reputation of the armed 
forces after the horrors of the dirty war. It would also 
elevate the junta to an authority which was certainly 
required to enforce Alemann’s economic package.”113
The junta, of course, realized that a war with 
Britain was extremely risky. Having an ongoing dis-
pute with Chile, Argentina risked fighting a two-front 
war if Britain and Chile were to collude. The Navy, 
the most hawkish branch of service in the Argentine 
military, clearly acknowledged that if Britain were to 
dispatch a nuclear submarine to the Falklands, then 
its invasion plan would be scuttled.114 A failure in re-
covering the Falklands would certainly mean the end 
of the junta’s rule. Nevertheless, the junta launched 
the invasion to perform what Oakes described as a 
“diversionary spectacle.”115 The announced with-
drawal of Endurance, the Nationality Bill, the inac-
curate assumption that the U.S. would at least remain 
neutral in the conflict, and Britain’s focus and even-
tual concession on Rhodesia all convinced the junta 
that Britain would not seek to recapture the remote 
islands once they were occupied by Argentina. As 
a consequence, the Falklands was not only an ideal 
target but also an easy one. Indeed, as Fravel suggests, 
the junta hoped that the invasion would force Britain 
to concede the Falklands’ sovereignty to Argentina 
in the ensuing negotiations.116 Argentina was so 
confident that Britain would not retaliate that the 
vice-admiral in charge of the invasion was not even 
instructed to prepare for the islands’ defense.117 The 
junta did not want a war with Britain, but instead 
tried to create a fait accompli in order to gain Brit-
ish concessions. As such, it could create a spectacle 
to demonstrate to the people that it is competent in 
defending national interests. 
One characteristic of the Falklands dispute 
deserves special attention—the role of nationalism in 
both Argentina and Britain. To Argentina, the Falk-
land Islands were considered sacred territory unjustly 
occupied by British colonialists, leaving Argentina 
as a humiliated victim of imperialism. Moreover, 
as Freedman described, “Some day, somehow, the 
nation would have to be completed,” and such an 
objective is not a matter of “legal title” but a matter of 
“national identity.”118 Juan Peron, the military dicta-
tor who ruled Argentina for nearly three decades 
after WWII, further promoted nationalism in Argen-
tina. Schools were instructed to teach “the Malvinas 
are Argentine,” and the slogan was even made into 
music.119 Not surprisingly, every sector of Argentine 
society firmly believed in the national cause, making 
the Falklands an ideal target for diversion. Yet nation-
alism, expressed in the popular press, also compelled 
the junta to be assertive in its negotiations because 
appearing uncommitted in the public’s eye would 
damage the junta’s legitimacy. 
For Britain, the Falklands were initially of only 
minor importance. As demonstrated above, consecu-
tive British governments attached low priority to the 
Falklands, which holds neither strategic nor econom-
ic importance. Thus, there was a “political imbalance” 
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regarding the Falklands between Britain and Argen-
tina.120 However, the islanders’ obstinate position of 
refusing any negotiations on sovereignty and their 
mobilization of British media and Parliament proved 
extremely effective in blocking the governments’ 
concessions to Argentina. Afraid of backdoor deals, 
the islanders wrote open letters to the Parliament and 
the press to criticize the “selling-out” of the British 
government.121 They also established the Falklands 
Islands Emergency Committee to lobby members of 
Parliament against any pressure that might be put on 
the islanders, especially on the issue of sovereignty.122 
In the South Georgia crisis that immediately pre-
ceded the war, the British government was under 
tremendous pressure from the press to remove the 
Argentine personnel on the South Georgia Island, 
a dependency island of the Falklands.123 Domestic 
pressure in Britain, although less fervent than Argen-
tine nationalism, prevented Britain from reaching an 
agreement with Argentina on the issue of sovereignty.
Another important feature of the dispute was 
how ultra-nationalists, through spontaneous ac-
tions, could endanger the fragile peace. Unexpected 
incidents caused by provocative actions by front-line 
actors, unknown by the junta, easily escalated tension 
around the region. A vivid example was “Operation 
Condor.” In September 1966, twenty young Argen-
tine ultra-nationalists hijacked an Argentine com-
mercial flight and landed in Stanley, “arresting” two 
British officials who approached them. Though they 
were quickly arrested by the Royal Marines and were 
sent back to Argentina, they were viewed as national 
heroes back home. The Argentine Foreign Minister, 
however, was appalled by the possibility that this 
incident could derail the ongoing negotiation.124 In 
February 1976, an Argentine destroyer fired warning 
shots at a British Research Ship Shackleton, causing 
Britain to divert a frigate to the region and further 
hurting Argentine-British relations.125 One can easily 
observe that private activists and hotheaded low-
level officers could hijack the diplomatic process and 
force both governments into a more forceful stance. 
It is entirely conceivable that China and Japan today 
face similar risks in their maritime dispute, as will be 
examined below.
V. CHINESE NATIONALISM AND DOMESTIC 
CONCERNS
The pro-democracy protest at the Tiananmen 
Square from May to June 1989 was a turning point in 
contemporary Chinese history. As historian Jonathan 
Spence notes, the 1989 protest, which called for the 
end of rampant economic corruption and later for 
the resignation of Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li 
Peng, reached “a scale unprecedented in the history 
of the PRC.”126 The CCP only maintained its rul-
ing status thanks to PLA units loyal to Deng and his 
fellow hardliners who were willing to perform the 
not-so-honorable task of “cleaning” the Square. The 
Tiananmen Square incident definitely could be the 
worst legitimacy crisis the CCP has ever faced, and 
back in the early 1990s, many observers in the world 
logically predicted that the days of the CCP could be 
numbered. Nearly two decades later, however, as Chi-
nese scholar Wang Zheng notes, the PRC has “a very 
patriotic and supporting populace that many gov-
ernments would be envious to have.”127 It is indeed 
puzzling how the Chinese government, once pushed 
to the verge of collapse, regained its legitimacy in a 
period that witnessed the rapid decline of Commu-
nist ideology and growing social tensions. 
When China embarked on its “Reform and 
Opening” period in the 1980s, Deng came up with 
the notion of “let some people become rich first” 
and then let them bring economic opportunities to 
the rest of the Chinese population.128 Deng’s ver-
sion of Reagan’s “trickle down” policy, however, did 
not bring “the others” to wealth as it promised to. 
Instead, income inequality emerged as a prime social 
conflict, and nepotism and grafts became prevalent 
in government officials, often colluding with busi-
nessmen who were very much willing to pay bribes. 
Granted, Chinese economic power skyrocketed fol-
lowing the reform, and the majority of the Chinese 
people, even those who did not become rich first, 
were better off. However, with economic achievement 
came the eventual demise of Communist ideology, 
once the CCP’s source of legitimacy. Mao’s utopian 
People’s Communes were replaced by official support 
of free market, and the Chinese public became curi-
ous about Western liberal political thought as well. 
The Tiananmen incident clearly demonstrated to the 
government that its mobilization capacity had greatly 
dwindled because Communism could no longer 
unite the entire population as the national ideology. 
The Chinese leadership also experienced a 
decrease of charisma and personal authority. Deng’s 
handpicked successor, Jiang Zemin, lacked the revo-
136
columbia university journal of politics & society
lutionary credentials of Mao and Deng.129 In fact, 
Shirk considers him to be a “compromise choice” 
after Tiananmen among different rival factions.130 
Jiang and his successors—Hu Jintao and his vice-
president Wen Jiabao—did not command the per-
sonal authority that Mao and Deng enjoyed. As Zhao 
Suisheng observes, the Chinese leadership today is 
more accountable to the people than before due to 
the public’s easy access to commercialized media to 
instantly get information and to express their views 
online.131 In other words, the days when “a charis-
matic dictator” would have “the authority to arbitrate 
disputes in the leadership or personally set the coun-
try’s course” are gone.132
To avoid another public backlash against the 
state like the Tiananmen incident and to enhance his 
personal authority, Jiang started a nationwide patri-
otic education campaign to instill patriotism as the 
new uniting ideology to replace Communism.133 The 
patriotic education campaign in national education 
system started in August 1994 when the Propaganda 
Department in charge of the campaign issued the 
document “Outline on Implementing Patriotic Edu-
cation.” This official document states: “patriotic edu-
cation…is the foundation of guiding people to estab-
lish the correct ideal, belief, life concept, and value, 
and a very important work for the entire society.”134 
The focus of the campaign not only included Chinese 
history and culture, but also the accomplishments of 
the CCP and the socialist modernization. Although 
the document states that patriotism is not “parochial 
nationalism,” Shirk contends that the campaign “has 
been single-mindedly promoting nationalism.”135 
Similarly, Zheng Wang describes this campaign as an 
“ideological reeducation.”136
Contemporary Chinese history features heav-
ily in the new patriotic campaign since the “century 
of humiliation,” a term referring to the period from 
the 1840s to 1940s when China was exploited by 
colonialists, highlights the CCP’s glorious efforts in 
defending China’s honor and making China a strong 
power today. Japan negatively occupies a central role 
in this campaign because of China’s painful histori-
cal memory of Sino-Japanese relations. Since Japan 
defeated the Qing Dynasty in the First Sino-Japanese 
War in 1895, it has been the most vicious aggressor 
against China. Japan’s numerous atrocities in the Sec-
ond Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945, especially 
the extremely notorious Rape of Nanjing, are taught 
and well-known to every Chinese citizen. A large 
part of the CCP’s legitimacy also stems from its anti-
Japanese struggle. Japanese failure to fully acknowl-
edge its guilt in WWII and its leaders’ visits to the 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which includes WWII 
Class-A criminals, keep the historical memory alive. 
Subsequently, the strong anti-Japan sentiments of the 
Chinese people make Japan-related issues ideal tar-
gets to divert attention from domestic problems.137 
Nevertheless, the patriotic education cam-
paign has not eradicated social dissatisfaction to-
ward the government. Problems caused by China’s 
rapid economic development and the instant access 
to information, made possible by China’s explod-
ing number of Internet users and commercialized 
media, aggravated many social issues into what the 
government calls “mass incidents,” de facto illegal 
gatherings or protests. Forced seizure of farmers’ land 
for construction programs, corruption of law-en-
forcement officials, and environmental pollutions all 
have triggered mass incidents. In late 2011, residents 
in Wukan, a fishing village in Guangdong Province, 
started a standoff with the local government over 
issues of illegal land seizure and arrest of dissidents. 
The conflict was so serious that the villagers eventu-
ally blocked all roads leading into the village, drawing 
international attention.138 In the end, the leaders of 
Guangdong province reached a deal with the villagers 
and agreed to the villagers’ demand that an election 
be held in the village to elect the council members 
of the village.139 In 2007, 2011, and 2012, protests 
against petrochemical plants broke out in Xiamen, 
Dalian, Shifang, and Ningbo, with some of them 
turning violent.140 One of the most recent mass in-
cidents took place in Hainan Province in November 
2014, with villagers smashing over ten government 
vehicles to protest against construction programs.141 
According to the “social blue book” published in 
2012 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the 
number of mass incidents in recent years has reached 
at least “tens of thousands.” Of these incidents, half 
was caused by forced land seizures, 30 percent by 
environmental problems and labor disputes, and 
another 20 percent by other reasons.142
In light of growing civil dissatisfaction, the 
government could choose either to conduct reform 
in accordance with dissidents’ wishes or to repress 
the protests. However, neither of the two options is 
ideal. As Huang Yasheng has written in Foreign Af-
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fairs, there are more calls for democracy and “hon-
esty, transparency, and accountability” from China’s 
hundreds of millions of netizens.143 Although these 
wishes have not created mass pro-democracy move-
ments like the one in 1989, they are of the same 
nature as the petitions of the protestors at Tianan-
men, and judging from the government’s previous 
response, it is hard to imagine how these wishes will 
be addressed in a way satisfying to the dissidents to-
day. After 1989, China “allowed maximum leeway in 
economic growth, both to distract the populace from 
making more political demands and to strengthen 
the nation as a whole,” and its high economic growth 
ameliorated many domestic criticisms of China’s 
authoritarian political system.144 Yet as signs of 
China’s economic slow-down start to emerge, one can 
expect more dissatisfaction with the government.145 
Moreover, the Chinese government tends to regard 
pro-democracy activities as “color revolutions” insti-
gated and used by the West for regime changes.146 Of 
course, it is possible that the CCP will see the neces-
sity of democratization in the future, but as Huang 
puts it, the process will be gradual and in a controlled 
manner, thus unlikely to placate the dissidents in the 
short term.147 Like the Argentine junta, the CCP may 
also want to buy more time in order to let it win elec-
tions in a multi-party system. The government can 
also choose to repress any potential demonstrations, 
and so far, there has been no mass incident even close 
in scale to the one in 1989. Nevertheless, in the age 
of the Internet and globalization, another forceful 
government reaction like the Tiananmen incident 
would instantly gain attention and condemnation 
and pose a far more serious legitimacy challenge to 
the government than if it chose not to suppress it 
at all. The government’s compromise at Wukan has 
already demonstrated that mere suppression of mass 
incidents is no longer feasible.
The enormous difficulties with both reform and 
repression leave a diversionary spectacle the most 
viable and attractive solution for the government. 
Indeed, in recent years, the world has witnessed more 
hawkish Chinese rhetoric. More in-service PLA of-
ficers appear on TV talk shows or write opinion arti-
cles to criticize what they perceive as provocative and 
hostile U.S. (and it allies’) policies in Asia and argue 
for a more uncompromising Chinese policy. Recently, 
Liu Yazhou, a general of the PLA Air Force, wrote an 
article titled “Soul of Servicemen” in a magazine, in 
which he proclaims: “For those who dare to infringe 
[upon China], soldiers must have the bravery and the 
spirit to hunt them till the end to kill them.”148 As 
scholar Hao Yufan notes, “the voice of the PLA has 
grown louder in recent years as territorial disputes in 
the East China Sea and South China Sea have intensi-
fied” and it “always arouses nationalistic public senti-
ment.”149 Assertive rhetoric is not limited to defend-
ing China’s interests, but has already touched upon 
the question of global order. Pang Zhongying, a pro-
fessor of international relations at Renmin University, 
posted an article on the website of The Global Times 
to predict the major role China will play in creating a 
new world order. He argues that, by providing “global 
public products” such as the Asian Infrastructure In-
vestment Bank, China is attracting more internation-
al supporters while the U.S.-led post-WWII order has 
been “damaged without recognition” by United State’s 
hegemonic practices.150 
Given the condition of Chinese nationalism 
examined above, it is not difficult to see why the Di-
aoyu/Senkaku dispute remains a major contention in 
the Sino-Japanese relationship. The Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands are a group of uninhabited islands in the East 
China Sea, about 400km west of Okinawa, 170km 
north of Taiwan, and 300km east of China.151 Japan 
took the islands after the First Sino-Japanese War and 
currently administers the islands, while both China 
and Taiwan claimed sovereignty of the islands after 
1972, when the United States transferred Okinawa 
(along with the islands) back to Japan and when 
oil deposits were discovered near the islands. Like 
how the Argentines view the Falklands, the Chinese 
view the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as sacred terri-
tory unjustly occupied by Japanese colonialism and 
militarism. 
Chinese nationalist sentiments were immediate-
ly ignited once the dispute emerged in the 1970s, but 
interestingly, it was the Chinese in Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, and North America that took the lead in hold-
ing demonstrations and protests. As scholar Chien-
peng Chung notes, the PRC government “was quite 
content to let the Chinese outside China take the lead 
in expressing the Chinese people’s outrage.”152 The 
Chinese government did not register a formal protest 
before Japanese officials until September 1996, when 
a group of Japanese right-wing nationalists landed on 
the islands to repair a damaged lighthouse and when 
one of the Hong Kong activists drowned while trying 
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to swim to the islands two weeks later. But even then, 
the government was determined to prevent public 
protests or anti-Japanese demonstrations from taking 
place, partly because it was afraid that the turmoil 
might scare away valuable Japanese investment and 
because the government may lose control of the 
protests.153 A nationwide anti-Japanese protest did 
break out in 2005, but it was mainly caused by Japan’s 
controversial revision of its historical textbook, not 
because of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The territori-
al dispute did not trigger a nationwide anti-Japanese 
demonstration until October 2010, when a Chinese 
fishing boat collided with Japanese Coast Guard 
vessels near the islands and its crew was detained. In 
Fall 2012, a larger protest broke out when Japanese 
right-wing nationalists landed on the islands, and the 
Japanese government “nationalized” the islands by 
purchasing them from their private owner, who was 
never identified. The 2012 protest was comprised of 
demonstrations in over eighty-five Chinese cities and 
included the smashing and looting of Japanese res-
taurants, vehicles, and products.154 In one infamous 
incident, a protestor smashed the skull of the owner 
of a Japanese car in Xi’an.155 
So why did the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute not 
create large anti-Japan demonstrations in China 
until 2010? The direct causes of the demonstrations 
were Japanese provocations, such as the landing of 
right-wingers and the “nationalization.” But Japanese 
actions from the 1970s to 1990s were not vastly dif-
ferent from actions in recent years, yet the Chinese 
government was determined to discourage any public 
protest on this issue. By contrast, in Fall 2012, the 
government “was complicit in tolerating” the dem-
onstrations and fanned popular anger by providing 
sympathetic media coverage to the protestors.156 This 
inconsistency should therefore mainly be explained 
by China’s domestic motivations, and the govern-
ment’s desire to instigate anti-Japanese nationalism as 
a diversion could be a reasonable explanation. 
It is important to realize that China’s recent 
state-encouraged public upheaval about the Diaoyu/
Senkaku dispute took place within the context of its 
assertive military actions in its maritime vicinity and 
was part of the government’s efforts to increase the 
region’s prominence. Seth Cropsey, former Deputy 
Undersecretary of the U.S. Navy under both Reagan 
and George H.W. Bush, clearly believes that Chinese 
actions in recent years have been more assertive than 
before. Cropsey cites Chinese standoffs with Japan 
around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, its evictions of 
Philippine fishing boats from the Scarborough Shoal 
in 2012, its announcement of the Air Defense Iden-
tification Zone (ADIZ) that covers the Diaoyu/Sen-
kaku Islands in November 2013, and its placement 
of an oil rig this May in the disputed Paracel Islands 
with Vietnam as signs of this new, systematic asser-
tiveness, compared to China’s isolated provocations 
in the past.157 Specifically regarding the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands, China made about 200 incursions 
into the airspace of the islands in 2013 that caused 
Japanese fighter jets to scramble about 300 times, 
compared to just two incursions in 2011.158 Taking 
into account the state’s heavy emphasis on contempo-
rary China’s suffering of external bullying and Japan’s 
atrocities, it is self-explanatory why China’s recent 
assertiveness both in rhetoric and actions would win 
domestic support for the government. The Diaoyu/
Senkaku dispute is not an isolated diversion, but is 
instead the most prominent part of a series of issues 
that have diversionary effects. 
Could China’s growing maritime assertiveness, 
especially in regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, 
be explained through a realist model? The answer is 
affirmative. Both the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands’ stra-
tegic importance and the shifting balance of power 
in East Asia contribute to the rising tension between 
China and Japan. The islands possess significant geo-
political value that neither China nor Japan can af-
ford to overlook. Japan is afraid that if the islands are 
controlled by China, the latter will use it as a platform 
to monitor U.S. and Japanese military activities near 
Okinawa, while China sees the control of the islands 
as necessary to break the first island chain (which 
links South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philip-
pines) to access the Pacific Ocean for its fledgling 
blue water navy.159 Similarly, Dr. Arthur Herman, an 
East Asian specialist at the Hudson Institute, regards 
the islands as “potential choke points for threatening 
China’s maritime security” like the Malacca Strait.160 
In the waters surrounding the islands there are also 
large amounts of oil and gas reserve, not a small al-
lure given the two economic powerhouses’ gigantic 
demand for energy and their heavy reliance on im-
ports. Finally, China and Japan both claim a 200-mile 
wide EEZ, which includes the islands. Although a 
successful claim on the islands will not automatically 
lead to the recognition of their EEZ claims, there is 
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no doubt it can at least strengthen their respective 
positions.161 Considering that both China and Japan 
have maritime disputes with other countries in Asia, 
the outcome of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute can have 
linkage effects beyond the East China Sea.
The changing dynamics of the balance of power 
in Asia has also toughened China’s actions. Whereas 
during Deng’s era and Jiang’s era the need for con-
tinuing Japanese investment was a major factor as to 
why they played down the territorial dispute in the 
East China Sea, most clearly expressed in Deng’s slo-
gan “set aside dispute and pursue joint development”, 
today, China no longer attaches the same economic 
importance to Japan. China surpassed Japan in terms 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2010, and many 
predict it will surpass the U.S. in the not-too-distant 
future.162 Although Japan still remains an important 
market for Chinese exports, China no longer de-
pends on Japanese investment for economic growth 
while more and more countries in Asia (including 
Japan) find China as their most important economic 
partner. China’s supreme economic status in Asia 
provides it more leverage in dealing with neighboring 
countries in maritime disputes. The growing strength 
of the PLA diminishes the deterrence effects of U.S. 
forces in Japan as well. To summarize, the Chinese 
government clearly did not create the Diaoyu/Sen-
kaku dispute out of thin air, nor has it intensified its 
claim over the islands just for the purpose of diver-
sion. Instead, realist explanations are capable of 
explaining more hawkish Chinese behaviors. 
Nevertheless, one cannot downplay the role of 
nationalism in the dispute nor deny the fact that the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute serves a diversionary pur-
pose. As shown in Manicom’s work, China and Japan 
have engaged in negotiations about the EEZ dispute 
and the joint development of the oil field in the East 
China Sea before and reached agreements. Therefore, 
as crucial as the energy potential is, there should be 
room for diplomatic negotiations and no reason for 
the two to treat the dispute as a zero-sum game. As 
for the islands’ strategic importance, it is insufficient 
to raise the tension to the level in recent years by it-
self. If the islands were of utmost geopolitical interest 
to China, then why didn’t the Chinese government 
formally protest Japanese actions until the 1990s and 
discourage civil demonstrations until 2010, while 
Chinese outside of Mainland China have conducted 
civil actions since the 1970s? Would it not be advan-
tageous to the PRC government if it could show the 
world that its people genuinely and strongly support 
its claim? Similarly for Japan, if it is so afraid that the 
PRC-controlled islands will pose an extremely seri-
ous security threat, then why has it not installed any 
military facilities on the islands beside a lighthouse? 
Rather than just looking at the dispute through the 
geopolitical prism, one should also consider the role 
of domestic politics in deteriorating the stability of 
the region. 
Since Japan occupies a central antagonistic role 
in the patriotic education campaign and the Diaoyu/
Senkaku dispute frequently appears in the press, it is 
no longer possible to downplay the issue in China. 
Together with more hawkish rhetoric, often tolerated 
by the state, nationalistic sentiments rose to a high 
level in China, culminating in the nationwide anti-
Japanese riot in 2012. Because gaining the control of 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is also a goal that appeals 
to all sections of Chinese society, the government 
benefits from acting tough vis-à-vis Japan to keep 
this issue an ongoing spectacle. Even if the Chinese 
government wants to reach a compromise with Japan, 
the nationalistic public and the commercialized 
media would guarantee another legitimacy crisis for 
the state for capitulating to Japan.163 As the Interna-
tional Crisis Group states in their report, backdoor 
diplomacy is no longer feasible due to domestic pres-
sures in China. Cropsey also thinks that nationalism 
“heated up the degree [of the dispute] a lot” more 
than if the dispute were just about geopolitics.164
VI.  THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU DISPUTE: COMPARI-
SON, AND CONCLUSION 
What does the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute have in 
common with the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and 
the Falklands War, and what can such a comparison 
tell us about the current dispute and the broader 
narration of a rising China? The comparison exposes 
the danger of China’s overplay of nationalism, high-
lights the need for a crisis-management mechanism 
between China and Japan, and questions the tradi-
tional wisdom of a rising China bidding for regional 
hegemony in Asia. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
serves as a reminder that China has a precedent of 
deliberately creating tensions in the region for do-
mestic political purposes. The shelling of Jinmen was 
not about taking over the islands, but about helping 
Mao launch his radical GLF movement because the 
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crisis could “mobilize the people and to re-create 
the revolutionary fervor of the civil war and Korean 
War days.”165 It is interesting to observe that, in the 
eyes of the PRC leaders, both the Jinmen Islands 
and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands carry tremendous 
domestic political significance, since they both evoke 
the public’s “nationalist pride and profound victim 
mentality.”166 The Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is viewed 
in China as an unsettled historical issue and an ugly 
legacy of Japanese colonialism, and just like the Jin-
men Islands, it can arouse nationalism by reminding 
the Chinese people of unfinished business with its 
enemy. 
One can find many common features shared 
by both the Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute. Both China and Argentina are challengers 
to the existing status quo, and both the Falklands 
and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have strong ap-
peals to every section in their respective societies. 
Nationalism, instead of the islands’ geopolitical or 
natural resources values, is the core of the disputes 
that prevents Argentina and China from reaching an 
agreement with Britain and Japan, respectively. Both 
China and Argentina seized this opportunity to cre-
ate diversionary spectacles, heating up nationalism 
sentiments domestically to draw the public’s attention 
away from their legitimacy crisis. However, by doing 
so, both governments face increasing public pres-
sure against any backdoor negotiations or diplomatic 
compromises. Just as Argentine diplomats have com-
plained to their British counterparts before the war 
that domestic pressure, reinforced by nationalistic 
media, had created tremendous difficulties for them 
to compromise, so did the Chinese Foreign Minis-
try in withstanding more and more public backlash. 
Shirk recalls that once a Foreign Ministry official told 
her that the Ministry had received mails with calcium 
pills in them from ordinary citizens who want them 
to have more “backbone” in handling foreign rela-
tions.167 The strong anti-Japanese mentality of the 
Chinese public, as represented by the 2012 nation-
wide riot, has basically made any secret negotiations 
impossible because a leak of such actions would cre-
ate another legitimacy crisis. 
Radical actions taken by zealous individuals are 
capable of escalating tensions in a very short period 
of time. As detailed before, “Operation Condor” 
deteriorated regional stabilities and the prospect of 
diplomatic solutions soon after it took place, yet its 
conductors were treated as heroes in Argentina. Like-
wise, attempted landings on the disputed islands by 
Chinese activists and the arrest of a Chinese fishing 
boat captain by Japanese Coast Guard in the islands’ 
surrounding waters sparked waves of anti-Japanese 
protests in China that worsened the already fragile 
Sino-Japanese relations. 
More importantly, the Chinese government 
today faces a similar dilemma the Argentine junta 
faced before 1982—inability to either reform or 
repress. The Chinese government has attempted to 
cleanse out corrupt officials, but because of the lack 
of an independent judiciary system and little over-
sight in rural areas, the government cannot system-
atically address the corruption problem. Popular 
anger ignited by rogue law enforcement agents and 
officials are likely to continue in the future. Further-
more, the government will not possibly comply with 
the growing demand that there should be an end 
to the one-party system. State media has frequently 
defended the one-party system as absolutely neces-
sary for China.168 It is equally hard to imagine that, 
in case another Tiananmen-like mass pro-democratic 
movement breaks out, the government will resort 
to the hardline response it took in 1989. This is not 
because the state lacks resources to suppress or does 
not have the authority to use its military forces for 
domestic suppression, but because the consequences 
of doing so will be much greater than they were two 
decades ago. In the age of the Internet, social media, 
and instant message software such as WeChat and 
QQ, events like the Tiananmen crackdown will be 
known by the entire nation and the world before the 
government issues a blackout. A violent crackdown 
may spark a more serious legitimacy crisis that the 
government is trying to avoid, and it can send a very 
negative message to Taiwan and other countries 
worrying about the rise of China, destroying China’s 
“peaceful rise” image that its leaders have tried hard 
to maintain. Diversion, therefore, becomes an in-
creasingly attractive option for the Chinese state.
Surely, there are many differences between the 
Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Brit-
ish population inhabited the Falklands Islands, and 
therefore their wishes to stay within Great Britain 
figured prominently in the dispute; the Diaoyu/Sen-
kaku Islands are uninhabited and “self-determina-
tion” plays no role in the dispute. China’s legitimacy 
crisis is considerably less severe than the one faced by 
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Galtieri’s junta: the economy, albeit slowing down, is 
still performing reasonably well, and in the near fu-
ture, there is little possibility (though not impossible) 
that any mass incidents will be similar in scale to the 
Tiananmen movement. The Chinese government is, 
at least for now, determined to avoid a war in East 
and South China Sea, whereas the Galtieri junta felt 
little danger in occupying the Falklands. The Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands also possess more geopolitical and 
natural resources value than the Falklands do. 
Still, there are some salient lessons to be learned 
from the three cases. First of all, a comparison be-
tween the Falklands War and the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
dispute highlights the danger of China’s overplay of 
nationalism. After about two decades of patriotic ed-
ucation campaign, anti-Japanese sentiment in China 
is already hard to ameliorate and can be quickly ignit-
ed by another incident between China and Japan. Just 
as Anglo-Argentine economic relations did not pre-
vent the two from going to war in 1982, one should 
not expect that the close Sino-Japanese economic 
ties will stop them from fighting over the uninhab-
ited rocks in East China Sea. Abe clearly realized the 
danger when he warned in January 2014 that “China 
and Japan were in a similar situation to Britain and 
Germany before 1914,” who went to war with each 
other in spite of close economic ties.169 More wor-
risome is the prospect that the territorial dispute 
can create a dominant and uniform social discourse 
in China. The prevalent anti-Japanese rhetoric may 
silence any members of society who hold doubts 
about the importance of the dispute over other social 
problems. As examined in the Falklands War sec-
tion, the political pressure created by the Falklands 
lobbies in Britain restrained the British government 
from reaching a deal with Argentina. The Chinese 
government is also less likely to reach an agreement 
with Japan if it perceives the social discourse that it 
helped to create in the first place as genuine wishes of 
the people. 
Another potential hazard of China’s overplay-
ing nationalism is that a diversionary action will look 
more and more attractive in the eyes of the govern-
ment in the future. China’s steady and rapid econom-
ic growth has kept the people generally content about 
the existing political system. However, if the Chinese 
economy slows down in the future (and there are 
already signs of it), latent social issues will rise to the 
surface, and there are bound to be more people cast-
ing doubt on the government’s legitimacy. By then, an 
act of assertiveness around the disputed islands will 
become an alluring option both to boost the public’s 
support and to buy time for the government to solve 
its domestic crisis. This scenario is all the more pos-
sible considering that it is the CCP that controls the 
PLA, meaning the Party could use the military as a 
last-ditch effort to save its ruling status. In a meeting 
with military personnel in November 2014, President 
Xi reaffirmed that the Party has “absolute leadership” 
over the military.170 Granted, this is a distant pos-
sibility, but it is still worthwhile to keep it in mind 
when predicting China’s economic and political situ-
ation in the future. 
The second lesson is the need to establish a 
crisis-management mechanism among China, Japan, 
and the U.S. with focus on the East China Sea. As 
shown by the Falklands dispute and by multiple 
instances in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, provoca-
tive actions taken by activists can deteriorate regional 
stability and create political turmoil rapidly. But 
since it is hard to keep track of all the activists’ plans, 
China and Japan could enhance their communication 
mechanism so that they can keep the malicious influ-
ence of these incidents to a minimum. Chinese activ-
ists who are arrested by Japanese Coast Guard should 
be quickly repatriated back to China or Taiwan, 
instead of sitting for trial in Japan. In the long term, 
Japan should also discourage its activists from land-
ing on the islands because such actions might trigger 
acts of revenge from Chinese activists. The United 
States must be ready to deal with potential incidents 
between China and Japan at any time. By getting 
first-hand information about the incidents, the U.S. 
can serve as a mediator to calm down the tension. 
When politically feasible, the U.S. should attempt 
to restrain Japanese provocative actions, such as the 
infamous visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Whenever 
Japanese officials visit the shrine, China and South 
Korea will express their outrage, and such visits will 
only worsen Japan’s image in Asia. Stopping the visits 
or at least making them non-official, can eliminate a 
major sore point in Sino-Japanese relations. 
Last but not least, a study of the three cases 
provokes second thoughts on the traditional wisdom 
that a rising China equals Chinese dominance in 
Asia. As prominent scholar David Shambaugh notes, 
“a mini-industry of ‘China rise’ prognosticators has 
emerged over the past decade” that argues “the China 
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juggernaut is unstoppable…”171 One of the prognos-
ticators is the structural (or offensive) realist John 
J. Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer holds that, “the best 
way for any state to ensure its survival is to be much 
more powerful than all the other states in the system, 
because the weaker states are unlikely to attack it 
for fear they will be soundly defeated.”172 Since it is 
impossible for China to become a global hegemon 
(because of U.S. power), China will “try to dominate 
the Asia-Pacific region much as the United States 
dominates the Western Hemisphere” at the cost of its 
neighboring countries and the United States, making 
its peaceful rise impossible.173 
However, none of China’s actions today have 
been as nearly provocative as the shelling of the Jin-
men Island in 1958, and the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis reminds people today that China has a history 
of intentionally creating tensions in Asia for domestic 
purposes. Mao Zedong explicitly announced dur-
ing the crisis that the “Western Pacific belongs to the 
people of the Western Pacific,” establishing China’s 
own model of the Monroe Doctrine.174 China, how-
ever, only supported this doctrine in rhetoric without 
any serious attempt at execution. By comparing the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute with the Falklands War, it is 
also clear that domestic politics serve as strong incen-
tives for China to act tough abroad. Consequently, 
China watchers should keep China’s domestic politi-
cal dynamics in mind before concluding that China 
is aiming to become a hegemon. A classical realist 
approach, instead of structural realism, should be 
a better candidate in guiding future China poli-
cies. As Jonathan Kirshner claims, “classical realism 
also places great emphasis on politics, domestic and 
international, and even considers the role of things 
like ideas, norms, and legitimacy.”175 While acknowl-
edging China’s rising power, it is also vital to realize 
its weakness at home and the limits of its power so 
that the world can engage with China peacefully. 
Mearsheimer’s approach “is suspect (at best) in its 
logic, handcuffed by the limits of its structuralism, 
and, ironically, rooted in utopianism—an attempt to 
reshape the world as one would like to see it, rather 
than respecting the realities of power.”176 Therefore, 
structural realism and the hostile policy it calls for 
will only create a self-fulfilling prophecy that can 
further destabilize East Asia. What the world, and 
especially the United States, should do is directly ad-
dress China’s nationalism and discuss the dangers of 
it directly with the Chinese leadership while taking 
a non-confrontational approach. Otherwise, a war 
between China and Japan, two strong naval powers, 
in the geographically important East China Sea will 
bring many more casualties and unpredictable politi-
cal crisis than the Falklands War did in 1982. 
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